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The movement of supplies from ship to shore to support
military forces in or near combat areas has historically been
difficult and time consuming. The Marine Corps and the Army
have developed their own systems for satisfying their
logistical needs. The Marine Corps has embraced the
prepositioning concept, while the Army has relied on moving
forces and utilizing logistics over the shore capabilities.
Regardless of the offload method used, the efficient
delivery of containerized cargo and equipment is critical to
the establishment of forces ashore. During May 1992, a
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) and Joint Logistics Over
the Shore (JLOTS) exercise was conducted at Onslow Beach,
North Carolina, to test these delivery systems. Ocean Venture
'92 provided a low- to mid-intensity platform for examining
MPF and JLOTS capabilities.
This thesis presents the organizations and equipment
requirements for MPF and JLOTS operations and assesses the
effectiveness of Ocean Venture '92 with respect to
accomplishing key objectives, problem identification, lessons
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Seal ift has been, and continues to be, the primary means
of transportation to support deployment of U.S. forces
overseas. In peacetime, these supplies are distributed
through host-nation port facilities. However, during times of
conflict or humanitarian need where port facilities access is
denied or unavailable, cargo must be moved from ships anchored
offshore to inland distribution points. This type of
operation is known as Logistics over the shore (LOTS)
.
LOTS operations are conducted over unimproved shorelines,
through fixed ports partially destroyed by combat action,
through shallow draft ports not accessible to deep draft
vessels, and through fixed ports that are inadequate without
utilizing supplemental LOTS capabilities.
A typical LOTS operation may include loading and unloading
of breakbulk materials, roll-on/roll-off vehicles, containers,
and bulk fuel and water from ships in the theater of
operations. Also included are shoreside operations,
stevedoring, water and fuel hoseline operations, and the
operation of ships, watercraft, and lighterage in the loading
and unloading area. (Somers, 1984)
The two primary missions for LOTS equipment are assault
and logistics. During an amphibious assault, the U.S. Navy
coordinates supply requirements. After the initial assault
phase, each service is responsible for establishing its own
logistics system. The environment for an assault is tactical
and hostile, compared to logistics operations which take place
in a benign environment. Cargo for an assault landing force
provides minimum essential equipment. However, logistics
resupply or buildup of forces consists of large volumes of
equipment which require a heavy lifting capability. (Vargo,
1977)
The movement of supplies from ship to shore to support
military forces has historically been difficult and time
consuming. The arrival of the container ship in the 1950 's
brought speed, efficiency, and fundamental changes to the U.S.
merchant marine fleet. This new capability also brought
significant problems for military logisticians who were tasked
with finding ways to discharge cargo from those ships if
seaports were damaged or unavailable. The movement by the
maritime industry towards containerization resulted in a
smaller number of ports and ships available, and less
flexibility for the military, thus making the job of ship to
shore movement more important, but also more difficult.
LOTS operations were utilized during World War II, Korea
and Vietnam. Although critical during these conflicts,
emphasis on the NATO scenario left the LOTS equipment and
force structure needed in other contingencies low in funding
priority. However, during the later years of the Carter
administration, events in Iran and Afghanistan led to the
formation of the Rapid Deployment Force with potential
missions in the Persian Gulf. Under the Reagan
administration, the goals of protecting U.S. national
interests continued to shift from a singular emphasis on NATO
to a global viewpoint. (Beakey, 1982)
The world situation has rapidly changed in the past
several years. The need for LOTS capabilities, and therefore
increased funding and higher prioritization, has never been
greater. As delineated in the Navy and Marine Corps White
Paper, From the Sea . dated September 1992, the National
Security Strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat
to a focus on regional challenges. Naval forces will shift
from a "cold war, open ocean, blue water naval strategy to a
regional, littoral, and expeditionary force." Warfighting
will shift from on the sea to joint operations conducted from
the sea.
Naval Forces will now be "operating forward from the sea,"
which means operating in the littoral or near- land areas of
the world. This includes the seaward area from the open ocean
to the shore. Force sustainment will also require forward
logistics, prepositioning, and strategic sealift. Having a
LOTS capability will be imperative in meeting regional
missions.
The Marine Corps and the Army have developed their own
systems for satisfying their individual logistics needs. The
Marine Corps has embraced the prepositioning concept, while
the Army has relied on moving forces and utilizing JLOTS
capability after a conflict has begun.
Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) operations are LOTS
operations conducted jointly by two or more service component
forces of a unified command (i.e., the Navy and Army). The
scope of a JLOTS operation will depend on geographical,
tactical, and time considerations.
B. OCEAN VENTURE '92 SCENARIO
From 11 May 1992 through 18 May 1992, as part of Ocean
Venture '92 (OV 92) , a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) and
Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) offload exercise was
conducted off the coast of North Carolina. The MPF offload
was conducted by Commander, Amphibious Group Two, designated
"Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force," and the following
subordinate commands: Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron
One (MPSRON ONE) , Naval Beach Group Two (NBG-2) , and the 2nd
Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF)
.
The JLOTS offload was conducted by the Commander, 7th
Transportation Group (Terminal) , U.S. Army, who was designated
as the JLOTS commander. The 11th Transportation Battalion
(Terminal) served as the Task Force Commander. Naval Beach
Group Two and MPS assets were under operational control of the
JLOTS commander during the JLOTS offload.
Ocean Venture '92 was a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-
directed, United States Commander in Chief, Atlantic
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(USCINCLANT) -sponsored, Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF)
140-executed joint exercise designed to accomplish the
following:
1. To train United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM)
headquarters and forces in the planning and conduct of
joint combat operations.
2. To exercise joint relationships and improve joint
operating procedures.
Ocean Venture '92 provided a low- to mid-intensity
platform for USCINCLANT and components to train personnel for
a wide variety of supporting and enabling tasks to established
standards using a realistic contingency operation scenario.
The exercise was designed to achieve these goals by maximizing
realism in exercise play for participating commands within the
constraints imposed by limited exercise maneuver area,
airspace, funds, available forces, safety and time.
The following names were used during OCEAN VENTURE '92 to
simulate the small island nations of the scenario:
Exercise Name Actual Location
Viarta Island Southern coastal North
Carolina
Pinto Island None — constructive island
SE of North Carolina
Colon Island Vicinity of Mackall Army Air
Field, NC
Jaguar Island Southern coastal North
Carolina and coastal South
Carolina
Lejeune Built-up area of Marine
Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC
Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station
Cherry Point and Havelock,
NC
The Caribbean island nations of Jaguar and Viarta are
close neighbors, yet far apart in terms of their history,
culture, standards of living, and political styles. Viarta is
a former British colony which has enjoyed a stable democratic
government on the British model and a stable economy based on
tourism and banking. Viarta has no history of conflict since
the Napoleonic Wars, with the exception of Allied basing
activities during WWII.
Jaguar is a former Spanish colony with a pattern of
dictatorial government alternating with democratic
experiments. A Socialist government followed a long period of
authoritarian rule in 1967. Disastrous Marxist economic
experiments and the fall of world sugar prices led to the fall
of the Socialists in 1978, but the failure of the Christian
Democratic Party to restore property rights resulted in the
overthrow of the government by a right-wing military junta in
1980. Within 3-4 years, the junta was dealing with the
Columbian Mendoza drug cartel, allowing the cartel to use
Jaguar as a production and transhipment point in return for
infusions of much-needed currency. Relations between Jaguar
and the U.S. are strained.
Jaguar is much larger than Viarta in both population and
land mass, but has relatively fewer resources. Its economy is
not as diversified or vigorous as Viarta' s, yet it must
support a substantial military organization. The government
is not diplomatically respected and is facing increasing
opposition. In response, it has tightened its links with the
drug cartel and turned outward for a solution to its
difficulties.
Since the mid-1980 's, the Jaguar ian government and the
Mendoza Drug cartel have infiltrated the fabric of Viartan
politics, business, and society, using the power of wealth, a
carefully crafted appeal to idealism, and increasingly
effective manipulation of public opinion and political
institutions. The cartel has taken the lead in this, with the
Jaguarian government remaining in the background.
The cartel has used its power to gain influence in Viartan
affairs. The cartel has successfully corrupted the Viartan
Prime Minister and his clique to force support of friendlier
relations with Jaguar and less friendly relations with the
U.S. By massive financing of opposition parties, the cartel
has reduced support of the majority Conservative Party from a
historical level of 80% to 56% in the most recent (1990)
elections.
The Prime Minister, in an effort to - reassert the
Conservative Party's dominance, has signed a number of mutual
support agreements with Jaguar since 1990. These included a
Peaceful Co-existence Agreement, an Economic Development
Agreement, and a Mutual Aid Agreement, culminating in a
Military Support Agreement signed in January 1992. This
stipulates that Jaguar is to provide forces for training and
Foreign International Defense in Viarta. One element of the
agreement calls for a Jaguarian military exercise in Viarta in
May of 1992. The agreements were never ratified and therefore
considered invalid by the Viartan government.
Jaguarian military units commenced preparations for the
exercise, and the first troops arrived in Viarta on 20 March.
Turmoil between the top posts in the government resulted in an
attempt by the foreign minister to seize power in a legal coup
attempt before parliament. The attempt barely failed, with
the foreign minister receiving 45% of the vote. As a result
of the continued Jaguarian build-up in Viarta and reports of
increased drug cartel influence, the prime minister sought
help from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the
Organization of American States (OAS) to persuade the
Jaguarian military to withdraw. The UNSC met 15 April 1992 to
discuss his request, but took no action before recessing for
the Easter holiday.
By 24 April 1992, approximately 2,500 Jaguarian troops
were on the ground in Viarta, and the island of Pinto was
completely under Jaguarian control. On the 27th, the prime
minister delivered a letter to the President requesting
military assistance and intervention by U.S. forces.
USCINCLANT assessed the primary tasks before it as:
1. Prevention of further introduction of Jaguarian troops,
equipment, and contraband into Viarta; and
2. Ejection of the Jaguarian forces already in Viarta.





3. Introduction of follow-on forces via MPF and JLOTS
A complete list of the forces who participated in Ocean
Venture is provided in Appendix B. A copy of the beach layout
is illustrated in Appendix C.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE
Regardless of the offload method utilized, the efficient
delivery of containerized cargo and equipment is critical to
the establishment of forces ashore. Ocean Venture '92
presented the opportunity to assess MPF and JLOTS capability.
This thesis will assess the effectiveness of Ocean Venture '92
with respect to key objectives that were to be accomplished,
problem identification, lessons learned and recommendations
for future exercises.
Chapter II will highlight the background of MPF/JLOTS
operations. The Crisis Force Module Concept will be discussed
in Chapter III. Equipment and organizations used in MPF and
JLOTS offloads is delineated in Chapters IV and V respec-
tively. Chapter VI will examine lessons learned while Chapter
VII provides the thesis summary.
II. BACKGROUND
A. MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE BACKGROUND
1. MPF Development
The need for maritime prepositioning was identified in
the Carter Doctrine, a policy declaring critical United States
interests in geographically remote regions of the world where
there was no need for permanent U.S. military presence.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) program in his report to
Congress on January 29, 1980:
...a force of Maritime Prepositioning Ships... will carry
in dehumidified storage the heavy equipment and supplies
for three Marine Brigades. During peacetime, these ships
will be stationed in waters near areas where U.S. forces
might be needed... not designated for amphibious assault
landings against enemy opposition. . .they will be able to
debark their equipment over the beach if no port is
available. Marine Corps personnel (and equipment not well
suited to storage) will, as necessary, be airlifted to the
vicinity of the ships, where they will marry up with their
gear and be ready for combat on short notice. .
.
In response to Presidential direction, a Near-Term
Prepositioning Force (NTPF) was deployed to the Indian Ocean,
and the first units of the dedicated MPF were included in the
FY 1981 shipbuilding budget. Seven ships were adapted for the
Navy's NTPF role. These included three roll on/roll off
ships, two breakbulk ships, and two tankers. The NTPF carried
supplies and equipment to support the 7th Marine Expeditionary
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Brigade (MEB) . These ships would be replaced in 1985 with an
MPF squadron of self-sustaining ships.
Over the next several years, funds were budgeted for
building and converting 13 merchant ships in order to form the
three Maritime Prepositioning Force squadrons (MPSRON)
.
Between 1984 and 1986, the MPF ships were loaded and deployed.
(Sumner, 1991)
2. Mission Capabilities
Maritime prepositioning provides the fleet commander
with deployment flexibility and increases U.S. ability to
respond rapidly to crises with a credible force. The
essential contribution of MPF operations stems from its
ability to concentrate forces quickly in an objective area.
The threat imposed by the presence of this power projection
capability provides a deterrent to potential adversaries. MPF
operations:
1. Offer an alternative to other forms of power projection




Serve as an economy of force measure in a secure
environment to preclude the requirement for forcible
entry by a larger force at a later time.
3. Provide a means whereby a MEB can be deployed with
minimal impact on other deployed forces given an early
decision and a secure airfield and beach port.
4. Provide the capability to rapidly reinforce a forward-
deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) , using the
speed afforded by airlift while capitalizing on the lift
capacity and rapid response of prepositioned sealift.
(MPF Ops, 1990)
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The Projected Operational Environment (POE) for each
Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron is defined as:
1. At sea in wartime.
2. Capable of getting underway on 24 hours notice after
normal protracted periods on station at anchor or
alongside a pier.
3. Off-load all cargo over a pier within three days, and in
the stream within five days, in conditions up to and
including sea state three. (Commanding Officer, MPS
Squadron ONE)
.
The three MPF squadrons are strategically positioned
around the world to ensure a rapid and sustainable military
response to short-warning global contingencies. The MPF
consists of three ship classes: the Waterman, Amsea, and
Maersk, which were converted or built specifically to meet MPS
requirements and are described later. The Atlantic Squadron,
known as Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One (MPSRON ONE) , is
made up of three Waterman ships and one Amsea ship. MPSRON
TWO in the Indian Ocean contains five Maersk ships. MPSRON
THREE in the western Pacific utilizes four Amsea ships.






Equipment & Supplies for Marine Expeditionary Brigade
FAST FL&UBLE GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE
Figure 1: MPF Global Picture
Appendix D is an operations summary of each MPSRON.
Today, each squadron is capable of carrying supplies
and equipment to sustain a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)
of approximately 16,000 Marines ashore for 30 days of
sustained combat. These huge ships are equipped to offload
pierside, or up to several miles offshore; this latter
procedure is known as "instream offloading."
The pierside offload is preferred due to its speed and
safety. Rolling stock is either lifted off via crane or
driven off. Containerized cargo is lifted directly to the
pier. Many ports have equipment and facilities which can be
utilized to rapidly offload the ships' cargo.
The instream offloading capability provides flexi-
bility in offload locations when a fixed port is infeasible or
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undesirable. With the ship at anchor, all rolling stock and
containers must be offloaded to floating lighterage which then
shuttles the materials to the shore. This operation is
inherently slower, more dangerous and susceptible to more
environmental factors then a pierside download. Once ashore,
the material is moved to a location where it is prepared for
issue to its accountable unit. The goal of the entire
evolution is to have Marines and their equipment in place and
operating within ten days after arrival in the operating area.
Operation Desert Shield validated the MPF concept when
the Indian Ocean-based MPSRON TWO arrived at the port of Al
Jubail just eight days after being tasked by President Bush.
Offload of three MPF ships simultaneously was accomplished in
just 36 hours with the exceptional host nation support
provided by Saudi Arabia.
The Marine Corps has shifted its focus toward mid- and
low-intensity conflict, and sought increased MPF flexibility
to respond to various contingencies, including everything from
combat situations to disaster relief. Most recently, the MPF
ships provided support to thousands of starving Somalis. This
fleet has provided a truly unique, global response capability
since 1986.
3. Concept of Operations and Responsibilities
MPF provides a strategic option to deploy men,
supplies, and equipment of a MAGTF. The MAGTF supplies and
equipment are prepositioned aboard forward deployed MPF ships,
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and the personnel are airlifted by the Air Mobility Command
directly into the area of operations. There, the personnel
join their equipment and prepare for subsequent operations







Figure 2 : MPF Concept
Source: Naval Beach Group TWO
An MPF operation is accomplished in four phases:
planning, marshalling, movement, and arrival and assembly.
1. Planning. MPF operations are characterized by both
contingency and execution planning. The planning phase
begins upon receipt of the warning order from JCS and is
continuous throughout the operation.
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2. Marshalling. During the marshalling phase, units
complete final preparations for movement to aerial ports
of embarkation and loading aboard aircraft.
3. Movement. The movement phase consists of the movement
of the forces by air and sea to the Arrival and Assembly
Area (AAA) . The movement phase begins upon lift-off of
the first aircraft from the departure airfield or when
the MPSRON begins transit to the AAA.
4. Arrival and Assembly. Arrival and assembly is the
crucial phase of an MPF operation. It begins upon
arrival of the first MPSRON ship or first aircraft of
the main body at the designated Arrival and Assembly
Area. This phase ends when all adequate supplies and
equipment have been off-loaded and issued to awaiting
units; command and control communications have been
established ashore; and the MPF MEB commander reports
all essential elements of the MEB have attained combat
readiness.
When an MPF operation is executed, the MPF itself is
comprised of a Command Element, or Commander, Maritime
Prepositioning Force (CMPF) , a Marine-Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) , a Naval Support Element (NSE) , a Maritime
Prepositioning Squadron, and other supporting forces as
necessary to provide security.
CMPF is designated in the Initiating Directive. He is
responsible for coordinating the time-phased arrival of MPF
elements in the designated arrival and assembly area.
Additionally, he provides for security of the MPF and
supporting forces in the AAA.
The MAGTF Commander, responsible for Marine Forces,
plans the airlift of the forces to the AAA and coordinates
arrival and assembly operations in the AAA.
The third component in the MPF organization is the
Commander of the MPS Squadron who ensures the MPSRON 's
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readiness to conduct offload operations. He exercises
tactical control of the MPSRON including movement to the AAA.
The Naval Support Element for a full MEB offload
consists of nearly 800 personnel from the Naval Beach Group
and Naval Cargo Handling and Port Group (NAVCHAPGRU) , and is
the link between the MAGTF equipments and supplies aboard the
MPSRON ships and the MAGTF personnel flown into the area by
Air Mobility Command. The NSE operates the ships' cranes and
all lighterage, conducts the ship to shore movement, performs
beachmaster functions, and provides limited camp support and
perimeter defense.
The NSE is task organized with a Beach Group staff
element and tailored detachments of Beachmaster Unit, Assault
Craft and Amphibious Construction Battalion personnel. The
NAVCHAPGRU provides approximately 150 personnel for a four
ship offload. The call up of reserve forces is critical to
manning the NSE because reservists comprise nearly 75% of
these units. In a crisis action situation, the NSE could
support up to a two ship offload without reserve call-ups, but
such action would severely drain the units of both sea and
shore personnel, effectively shutting down many home port
operations.
The MPF ability offers operational commanders great
flexibility in responding to various scenarios. MPF, however,
is not without its limitations. With no forced entry
capability, it requires a secure area for operations. Airlift
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availability is a major concern, particularly during large
scale contingencies when demands on the Air Mobility Command
reach saturation. Command relationships are complex, and the
entire operation is time sensitive as all individual elements
must link up.
B. JOINT LOGISTICS OVER THE SHORE
1 . Background
Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) is the loading and
unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port
facilities. Both the Army and the Navy may conduct LOTS
operations. In an amphibious operation the Navy may conduct
LOTS operations in conjunction with the Marine Corps as a
naval operation. During an amphibious operation, the Navy is
responsible for the discharge of cargo and its movement to the
highwater mark, where the landing force assumes responsibility
for transfer and transportation to inland assembly points.
An Army LOTS operation may be conducted as part of the
base, garrison, or theater establishment which immediately
follows an amphibious operation, or as a separate evolution
with no amphibious operation. During Army LOTS operations,
cargo is moved ashore and transferred to a transportation
agency for onward movement.
Prior to 1970, the Army's capability to unload
deepwater ships was built around the Terminal Service
Companies. These companies, sometimes referred to as
stevedore units, were large organizations equipped and trained
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to perforin discharge operations in either a fixed port with
deepwater piers, or in a LOTS operation. When required to
discharge cargo in a LOTS mission, Army boat and amphibian
units were assigned to move cargo from ship to shore.
Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) operations are
LOTS operations conducted jointly by two or more service
component forces of a unified command. The scope of a JLOTS
operation will depend on geographical, tactical, and time
considerations
.
2. Concept of Operations
In operations or exercises involving more than one
service, the Joint Force Commander relies on the host nation
to provide ports and transportation services to support
theater requirements. However, there will be situations in
which the ports are destroyed, substandard or inaccessible.
The Commander may then direct JLOTS operations.
The JLOTS operation which begins after an amphibious
assault requires a smooth transition phase. During the
transition from an amphibious assault to a JLOTS operation,
Naval and Army Commanders arrange for transfer of command
responsibility to the JLOTS Commander. The Commander's major
tasks are to establish security, and to facilitate the cargo
discharge through a tactical operations center and lighterage
control center. Maintaining an effective command, control and
communications structure is essential to a steady JLOTS
operation. The JLOTS Commander also has at his disposal an
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engineer port construction company to assist in beach
preparation, and in the installation of cargo discharge
platforms.
The JLOTS Commander must synchronize all efforts to
maintain continuity of operations. Proper integration of a
myriad of Army, Navy and Marine units adds depth to the JLOTS
support structure and ensures a throughput capacity that
supports the Joint Force Commander's priorities. The goal of
every JLOTS operation is to safely and efficiently discharge
cargo to the correct unit(s) ashore. Cargo is categorized as:
containers, breakbulk, unit equipment, liquids (water or
fuel) , and retrograde.
In a JLOTS scenario, whether the JLOTS Commander is
from the Army or Navy component, Naval offload personnel and
equipment are under operational control of the JLOTS Commander
and assimilated into appropriate task organizations. Adminis-
trative control remains with the Naval Component Commander.
In a pierside operation, command and control of Army and Naval
units falls under the command of their respective service.
The following characteristics or criteria are used to
evaluate the effectiveness of a reliable JLOTS operation:
1. JLOTS operations are characterized by sustained, high-
tonnage movements from ship to shore. Each link in the
system must be able to maintain the flow of cargo to
support the personnel ashore.




JLOTS operations are conducted in austere environments
.
Frequently, limited shore facilities are available to
maintain watercraft and related equipment.
4. All JLOTS equipment must be capable of operating in
moderately rough seas (up to sea state 3) . Subsystems
that operate only in calm seas and ideal weather limit
the entire evolution to that of the lowest common
denominator.
5. Rapid deployability of equipment required to run a JLOTS
operation is critical. (JCS Pub 4-03)
The ability to conduct effective joint operations such
as JLOTS has never been more important. As stated in From The
Sea , "the battlefield of the future will demand that everyone




III. CRISIS FORCE MODULE CONCEPT TESTING
A. BACKGROUND OF MPF LOAD CONFIGURATION
Operation Desert Shield was the first event in which the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) concept was utilized on a
large scale. Until then, only relatively small exercises had
been conducted. In that operation MPF ships equipped and
sustained a Marine force of over 30,000. Desert Shield
provided a unique opportunity to evaluate every aspect of the
MPF concept, from the initial decision to use MPF capability
through the restocking of used equipment and supplies
afterwards. The three MPF squadrons were successfully
offloaded, allowing the Navy and Marine Corps to gather
extensive data and personnel expertise which will enhance the
MPF's proficiency through the 1990's. (Geis, Hill,
Ivancovich, 1992)
Each of the MPF ships utilized during Desert Storm had
similar load configurations of equipment and -supplies. The
supplies were spread uniformly, or "spreadloaded, " among all
ships in a squadron; each ship carried almost identical
equipment and supplies. For a full four or five ship offload,
this spreadloading was very effective. However, when the
emphasis changed to regional conflicts, and the role of the
MPF ships shifted to serving more specific needs, the
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rationale for how each ship's load was configured also
changed
.
As a result of recommendations in the FMF Force Module
Enhancement Study (CNA, 1991) and the lessons learned from
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the MPF load structure was
reconfigured to support different force modules. Force
modules are task forces of different sizes and missions
designed by the Fleet Marine Force to enhance Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) sustainment and promote MPF
employment and deployment flexibility. The modules applicable
to MPF operations range in size from a Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU) of about 2,700 Marines to a MEB-sized force of
16,000 Marines. Under the Crisis Force Module concept,
missions will range from humanitarian assistance to all levels
of conflict.
The four typical force modules an MPF will support are:
1. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) employed with one MPS
ship and a Fly-in-Echelon (FIE) via strategic airlift.
2. A Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) capable MAGTF employed




A LIC capable MAGTF employed with three MPS ships and
a FIE.
4. An MPF MEB employed with a full MPSRON and a FIE.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the following equipment and
containers will be offloaded to sustain the personnel listed










LIC MEB I 12649 1320 1140
LIC MEB II 12649 1980 1710
KEB 16500 2640 2280
Figure 3: MPF Module Loadouts
Source: Naval Beach Group Two OPLAN 201
Figure 4 illustrates the number of MPF ships, amphibious




MPF ships Amphibs Sorties*
MEU 1 22
LIC MEB I 2 4 OR 5 91
LIC MEB II 3 113
MEB 4 249
*C-141 Equiva lents
Figure 4: Priority Force Modules
Source: Naval Beach Group Two OPLAN 201
24
Each MPF squadron has been reconfigured such that each
ship in the squadron is assigned a primary force module
functional assignment and a secondary assignment. Figure 5
outlines the priority force module assignments for the three
MPS squadrons
.
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Figure 5: MPF Force Module Loads
Source: Naval Beach Group Two OPLAN 201
The reconfiguration of the MPF loads was designed to
enhance MPF operations by reducing the ready-to-operate time.
This is the time required to conduct an MPF operation and
stand up the Marines on the beach, ready to carry out their
operational commitments. Initial reductions in time come from
pre-planning the loads. Thus, when a force module is
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required, ships will have been identified to meet the missions
which have the best mix of equipment onboard. Additionally,
the modules allow for smaller fly-in-echelons which are
tailored to assemble with appropriate equipment and supplies.
Airlift requirements for the fly-in-echelons are reduced, thus
reducing the ready-to-operate time.
Prior container placement planning for mission essential
systems onboard the ships has significant impact on offload
and set up times. Force module equipment identified in
advance can be labeled and placed close to ramps and
offloading lanes that will be used during pierside or instream
offloads. Priority load plans in support of the force module
concept also reduce offload times. The result is a flexible
MPF program which allows commanders the opportunity to task-
organize to meet specific missions.
B. OCEAN VENTURE '92
Physical tailoring of each squadron occurred prior to the
retrograde movement of MPF equipment from South West Asia.
All equipment and supplies were reorganized in accordance with
force module constraints before being backloaded on the ships.
Consequently, Ocean Venture '92 was the first test and
evaluation of an MPS squadron load reconfigured to support the
Fleet Marine Force priority force modules.
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT) and MPSRON-ONE
participated in the exercise. The force module to be tested
was the Marine Expeditionary Unit slice (MEU slice) concept.
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The MEU slice consists of the equipment and supplies onboard
an MPF slip designated to support a MEU. The squadron ship
with primary responsibility for the MEU slice offload was the
SS Obregon. The actual load of the SS Obregon was designed to
support a MEU-sized MAGTF with a minimal amount of airlift.
The equipment aboard the ship was loaded so that the MEU slice
could be offloaded selectively without the movement of non-MEU
slice equipment. The SS Obregon was to be offloaded instream
using the shipboard Lift on/Lift off (LO/LO) system. In order
to test the MEU slice concept, only the lighterage and
material handling equipment onboard the SS Obregon was
available for usage. The quicker Roll on/Roll off (RO/RO)
operation utilizing a ramp system was not exercised due to
the limited pieces of lighterage available to support this
scenario.
As currently configured, the SS Obregon holds approxi-
mately 190 containers on the weatherdeck, and an additional
385 containers below deck. The ship also holds about 725
Principal End Items (PEI) such as vehicles. The MEU slice OV
'92 offload consisted of 257 PEI's and 103 containers. These
represented what would normally be offloaded in a real
situation, with the exception of approximately 47 ammunition
containers stored below the weatherdecks . The decision to not
offload ammunition containers is viewed as an exercise
artificiality, and data collected throughout the exercise was
adjusted accordingly for this decision.
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Previous exercises have concentrated on the time it took
to lift the cargo from the ship onto lighterage to move it to
the beach. OV '92 provided the opportunity to also look at
throughput operations. Throughput includes the time it takes
equipment and containers to transit from the ship, offload at
the beach, and move to the Marine Arrival and Assembly
Operations Element and Container Operations Terminal (AAOE/
COT) .
One factor which can constrain the MEU slice throughput
operation concerns the time required for each barge to load at
the ship, transit to the beach, offload at the beach, and
transit back to the ship. This is referred to as the offload
cycle time. A short transit time from the ship to the beach
could potentially cause delays due to the previously mentioned
shortage of material handling equipment. OV '92 did not
experience queuing backlogs on the beach because the ship was
anchored four miles offshore. The offload cycle time proved
sufficiently long to prevent throughput delays at the beach.
C. EXECUTION
The offload began on the morning of 12 May and was
completed on the morning of 14 May. The PEI and container
offload required 53 hours, or 2 . 2 days. Assuming an offload
rate of 2.2 containers per hour, the potential offload of the
additional ammunition containers required to complete a full
MEU slice offload would have added 24 hours to the exercise.
(CNA, 1992) This implies the offload would still have been
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completed within the Marine Corps standard of three days for
a MEU slice operation.
Therefore, the force module concept for a MEU Slice module
was validated during the OV '92 exercise. Equipment
associated with the MEU slice was easily accessible, and
minimal movement of non-MEU slice equipment was required.
D. LESSONS LEARNED
The most important area of concern demonstrated during OV
'92, was the loadout of the MEU MPF ship. Loadout refers to
the placement of PEIs and containers onboard the ship. Ship
loadout is extremely important during LO/LO operations which
are slower and more dangerous than pierside or RO/RO
operations. Thus, the ship should be loaded to accommodate a
LO/LO operation. A more efficient loadout will translate to
a more efficient throughput operation.
After optimizing the loadout for LO/LO operations, the
offload of the MEU ship should support the most likely mission
of the force. Equipment needed for combat or security
missions varies widely from the equipment needed during a
humanitarian or civil affairs offload. The accessibility for
offload of the required equipment severely impacts when the
Marine operation may begin. A pierside offload allows for all
rolling stock to be available in a relatively short amount of
time. An instream offload requires priority staging due to
the requirement that certain PEI's must be available early in
the offload. (Newton, 199 3)
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This problem was evidenced during OV '92. The SS Obregon
was not loaded to support any particular mission. Thus the
arrival of combat essential PEI's and containers was delayed
by the late offload of specialized PEI's. The late offload of
the containers potentially could have kept Marines from
initiating action until the entire offload was nearly
complete. (CNA, 1992) Non-combatant missions would also have
been delayed because required equipment for these operations
was not offloaded until the last day. Again, the Marines
would have had to wait on the beach almost three days before
initiating their mission.
The MEU slice force module has some limitations associated
with throughput operations. The most important is the
availability of Rough Terrain Container Handlers (RTCHs) for
handling container throughput. The MEU slice ship carries
only three RTCHs. Consequently, the shore organization for
this force module must be structured around this constraint.
Ideally, two RTCHs should be on the beach at all times. One
would be utilized to offload incoming barges -and the other
would load containers onto the Marine Logistics Vehicle System
(LVSs) for movement to the AAOE. This system does lead to the
possibility of overworking the one RTCH stationed at the AAOE.
A second alternative would be to position one RTCH at the
beach and two RTCHs at the AAOE. Again, the problem would be
overworking the one RTCH, this time located at the beach.
The first option was deployed during OV '92. Personnel from
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the Center for Naval Analysis observed that having a single
RTCH at the AAOE did not adversely affect the operation. The
relatively small number of pieces offloaded during the MEU
Slice, compared to the other force modules, offset positioning
only one RTCH at the AAOE.
The MEU slice concept presents a unique problem for
offload logistics planning. Previous offload plans have
focused on the quickest means of getting equipment from ship
to shore. The MEU slice adds the challenge of selectivity to
offload operations; priorities must be planned and adhered to.
Changes can adversely impact throughput operations. With
limited material handling equipment, lighterage, and
offloading only selected pieces of equipment, planning and




A. GENERAL ORGANIZATION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
When a Maritime Prepositioning Force operation is
executed, the MPF itself is comprised of a command element,
the Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF) , a Marine
Amphibious Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) , a Maritime
Prepositioning Ship Squadron (COMPSRON) , a Naval Support
Element (NSE) and other supporting forces as necessary to
provide security. CMPF, designated in the Initiating
Directive, is comparable to the Commander, Amphibious Task
Force in amphibious operations. The MAGTF, NSE, and MPSRON
are under operational control of the designated CMPF. The








Figure 6: Generic MPF Command Structure
Source: Naval Beach Group TWO OPLAN 201
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The specific command structure for Ocean Venture '92 is
delineated in Figure 7. Commander, Amphibious Squadron TWO
(COMPHIBRON TWO) was designated to act as the CMPF. The MAGTF
established an MPF Offload Control Group (MOCG) to execute the
offload. The MPS Squadron used was COMPSRON ONE homeported in
Norfolk, VA. Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 210 (MIUWU)










Figure 7: MPF Command Structure for Ocean Venture '92
Source: Naval Beach Group TWO OPLAN 201





Coordination of the time-phased arrival of
MPF elements
Offload of MPF equipment and supplies
Security of MPF and supporting forces
Recommendation for termination of MPF
operation to higher authority
Airlift of all Marine forces




Participate in offload planning with the
MAGTF and COMPSRON
Establish reserve augmentation requirement
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Conduct offload, operate ships cranes, man/
operate all lighterage, control the beach
MPS SQUADRON: Readiness for conduct of offload operations
Tactical control of the MPSRON
Movement of the MPSRON to AAA
Messing/billeting for embarked personnel
Coordination of port services and anchorages
(OH 1-5,1990)
Upon receipt of the Joint Chief of Staff's warning order,
the movement phase, followed by the arrival and assembly
phase, of the MPF operation begins. During the movement
phase, the MPF is divided into two movement groups: those
that arrive by air and those that deploy by sea. The forces
which arrive by air, also called the Fly-in-Echelon (FIE)
,
include the Survey, Liaison, Reconnaissance Party (SLRP) , Off-
load Preparation Party (OPP) , the Advance Party, and the Main
Body. Those that deploy by sea normally include the COMPSRON
and associated escorts. These forces comprise the elements
responsible for effecting ship discharge, movement of cargo to
the beach, and throughput operations to the AAOE.
Arrival and Assembly operations begin upon the arrival of
the first MPSRON ship or first aircraft of the FIE to the
Arrival and Assembly Area (AAA) . Arrival and assembly is the
final and most crucial phase of an MPF operation. Timelines
were established by the II MEF as delineated in the Arrival
and Assembly Plan for Ocean Venture '92. Ocean Venture '92
arrival and assembly operations were conducted over ten days




ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY PLAN
(CNA, 1992)
DATE ACTION
minus 7 (0-7) OPP embarks MPSRON-ONE
minus 3 (0-3) SLRP deploys
minus 2 (0-2) MPSRON on station
Advance party arrives
DAY Offload begins
plus 2 (0+2) Offload complete
The Offload Preparation Party (OPP) is a temporary NSE/MEB
detachment responsible for preparing the lighterage, hose
reels, rolling stock, and cranes for discharge. The OPP must
be thoroughly familiar with the configuration of the ship and
the ship's load plan. Upon activation, the OPP is either
transported to the ships prior to deployment, during transit,
or when it arrives in the AAA. Ideally, the OPP shall be
deployed at least 96 hours in advance of arrival in the AAA.
The Officer in Charge of the OPP will be a Naval Officer
designated by Commander, Naval Support Element (CNSE) (OH 1-
5) . The OPP for a four ship offload is composed of approxi-
mately 300 MEB and 100 NSE personnel. For a MEU slice
offload, the OPP is reduced to approximately 100 personnel.
When the ship arrives at the discharge site, the OPP, SLRP,
Advance Party, and the Main Body of the offload team join to
form the NSE.
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The OPP deployed by surface means during Ocean Venture '92
on 0-7 days and embarked aboard the MPSRON-ONE ship SS Obregon
in the vicinity of Morehead City, North Carolina. The
Commander of the Naval Support Element (CNSE) was assigned
operational control of the OPP. Once embarked, the Navy
members of the OPP prepared the ship's cranes and lighterage
to support the offload. Members of the Marine portion of the
OPP prepared the equipment and supplies to be offloaded.
Preparation included pre-operation vehicle maintenance, and
identifying and marking principal end items and containers for
distribution.
In most cases, the Survey, Liaison, Reconnaissance Party
(SLRP) is flown to the designated offload site several days in
advance of the Main Body to survey the site and conduct
liaison with the host nation. The results of the survey are
then sent to the MEB and NSE Commanders prior to the departure
of the Main Body. This allows changes to offload planning,
personnel and equipment requirements to occur prior to
departing CONUS. The SLRP for a full four- ship offload
consists of 90 MEB and seven NSE personnel. For a MEU slice
offload, the number is reduced to approximately 30. The Navy
team reports to the MEB Commander until the NSE Commander
arrives on station.
For Ocean Venture '92, the SLRP deployed as directed by
the Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force (CMPF) at 0-3
days to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina for movement to the
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exercise site, Onslow Beach. Once established, the SLRP
confirmed essential information for the execution of arrival
and assembly operations, finalized support requirements
provided by outside agencies, and formed the nucleus of the
arrival organizations. The SLRP is dissolved upon the arrival
of the first element of the Advance Party.
An Advance Party is formed from the deployment support
elements of the Main Body which are not in the SLRP. The
primary task of the Advance Party is to arrange for the
reception of the Main Body of the FIE. The Advance Party for
Ocean Venture '92 deployed on 0-2 days to prepare for the
offload, reception, and throughput of equipment and supplies.
The party established appropriate arrival and assembly
organizations, command and communications systems, and then
tested these systems. In addition, roads and staging areas on
the beach were marked for control and reception of equipment
and supplies.
The Main Body of the FIE is the balance of forces
remaining to be moved after the OPP, SLRP, and Advance Party
have deployed. The flow of the Main Body must be carefully
monitored so that their arrival does not overwhelm available
logistical support. Main Body forces for Ocean Venture '92
began arriving on 0-day and continued arriving until 0+2 day.
B. OFFLOAD OPERATIONS
The Navy Support Element (NSE) in its role as a component
of the MPF, conducts the offload of MPSRON ships. The NSE is
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the link between the Marine equipment and supplies aboard the
squadron ships and the Marine personnel flown into the AAA.
Naval Beach Group units report to the Commander, Naval Support
Element (CNSE) . As reflected in Figure 8, the Naval Beach
Group exercises operational control over its own units and
coordinates with the Naval Special Warfare Group and Naval




















Figure 8: Naval Beach Group Operational Organization
Source: (OH 1-5)
Once the Arrival and Assembly phase begins, the NSE is


















Figure 9: Navy Support Element Organization
Source: (OH 1-5)
The commander of the NSE and his Offload Control Officer
(OCO) control all NSE operations from the MPSRON flagship.
The OCO has full responsibility for controlling the debark
officers, ship to shore movement and the beach party ashore.
Special teams and personnel are assigned as follows (OH 1-5)
:
Debark Teams: A debark officer on each ship coordinates the
cargo handling detachment and Marine debark team, the civilian
ship's crew as assigned, and lighterage assigned to the ship
to conduct the offload.
Lighterage Control Officer (LCO) : An LCO is assigned to
each ship and is responsible for directing lighterage to the
appropriate position for loading. Upon completion of loading,
he dispatches the lighterage to the OCO for movement to the
shore.
Cargo Handling Detachments: NSE personnel are assigned to
each ship during the offload. The detachment consists of
cargo handling forces from the OPP, augmented by additional
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personnel as required. The detachment provides supervisory
and technical personnel to offload the cargo from the deck or
hatch onto the lighterage alongside the ship. Duties may
include unlashing weather deck cargo and operation of the
ship's equipment necessary for the offload.
Marine Corps Debark Teams: USMC personnel assigned consist
of maintenance and equipment operators from the OPP. They
assist in unlashing vehicles and equipment below deck,
complete vehicle activation, stage material in hatch squares,
provide vehicle operators, and assist the cargo handling
detachment
.
Beach Party Group: The ship-to-shore movement is not
complete until the equipment has been transported to the high
water mark on the beach. As directed by the 0C0, the group
assists in beach and anchorage reconnaissance, lifeguard, and
swimmer security support.
tittfft; t t i
Figure 10: Beach Party Group Directing LCM-8
Source: LT Barrett
The individual pieces of lighterage operate as directed by
the OCO. The following NSE lighterage is prepositioned in
each MPS squadron:
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1. Causeway Section, Powered (CSP)
Powered by two 360 degree rotatable water jets, these
causeway sections provide the mobile power for the causeway













Figure 11: Causeway Section, Powered
Source: JCS Pub 4-03
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2. Causeway Section, Non-powered (CSNP)
These sections come in two types; beach ends and
intermediate ends. Beach ends allow vehicles and container
handlers to drive on and off when the section is at the beach





Draft, loaded 4 FEET
Figure 12: Causeway Section, Non-powered, Beach End
Source: JC8 Pub 4-03
3. Causeway Ferry
The primary method of transporting containers/vehicles
ashore is by the use of causeway ferries. Ferries will be
42
constructed in a ratio of powered/non-powered sections, as
determined by the CNSE, based on weather conditions and load
requirements. The minimum size ferry is one powered section
with one beach end (CSP+1) . The largest practical size is one







100 TONS per non-powered section




4. Side Loadable Warping Tug (SLWT)
The SLWT shown in Figure 13 is a CSP to which an A-
frame and a winch has been added. SLWTs assist craft for
causeway ferries and are not available to move cargo because












Figure 13: SLWT's underway during OV '92
Source: LT Barrett
5. Landing Craft, mechanized (LCM-8)
Shown in Figure 14, two LCM-8 's are provided on each
ship for the discharge of vehicles, placement of fender
















3. 8 FEET FWD




1 (offloaded by crane only)
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Figure 14: LCM-8 unloading a truck on the beach
Source: LT Barrett
Both LCM-8s and Causeway Ferries have navigational lights
and can operate under conditions of reduced visibility (OH 1-
5/Naval Beach Group TWO OPLAN 201)
.
C. OCEAN VENTURE '92 MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE OFFLOAD
Arrival and Assembly operations were to begin for Ocean
Venture '92 on the order of the CMPF. COMPSRON ONE ships SS
Obregon, SS Kocak and SS Pless arrived in the exercise area as
scheduled on 11 May 1992. Equipment and supplies were to be
offloaded from the SS Obregon on O-day, 12 May. The operation
was conducted in and around Onslow Beach at Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina. The SS Obregon was anchored approximately
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four miles offshore. In order to test the MEU slice concept,
only the lighterage from the SS Obregon was used for the
offload. The final decision to stop Lift on/Lift off (LO/LO)
operations due to weather conditions rested with the CMPF
after consulting with the CNSE, the COMPSRON, and Marines.
As recommended by the Center for Naval Analyses report on
MPF Exercise Anus Tara, 1990, lighterage onboard the Obregon
was offloaded on 0-1 day, or 11 May, prior to beginning the
official offload. This change enabled the Marines to begin
cargo offload on schedule on 0-day to determine the exact
amount of time for the actual cargo offload. During Exercise
Ahus Tara '90, the day for lighterage offload was included in
the offload timelines, thus making the offload data inconsis-
tent with other exercise timelines. (CNA Ahus Tara, 1990)
Prior to O-day, lighterage for Ocean Venture '92 was
assembled and selected pieces of Material Handling Equipment
(MHE) were offloaded. The II MEF Arrival and Assembly plan
originally called for lighterage to be constructed of two
CSP+ls, and two CSP+3S. Instead, four CSP+2s were assembled.
This decision was based on past research which indicated that
barge queuing is minimized in ship-to-shore operations by
using barges that are uniform in capacity (CNA Exercise
Summary, 1991) . Lighterage assembly began at 0445 on 11 May
and was completed at 2230 11 May.
Two barge sorties were utilized to deliver three Rough
Terrain Container Handlers (RTCH) , one front end loader, and
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two Lighter, Amphibious Resupply Cargo (LARCs) to the beach.
The operation began on 11 May and took six hours to complete.
Table 3 presents a timeline of significant events for OV '92
(CNA Report, MPF Ocean Venture '92)
.
TABLE 3
TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS FOR OV-92 MPF OPERATION
Source: Naval Beach Group TWO OPLAN 201
DATE/EVENT TIME
10 May 92
Ships arrive in area
1200
11 May 92
Lighter offload begins 0445
First CSP+2 formed 1415
Second CSP+2 formed 1500
Offload of MHE begins 1500
Third CSP+2 formed 1930
Offload of MHE ends 2015
Fourth CSP+2 formed, Lighter assembly complete 2230
12 May 92
Offload operation begins 0600
AAV offload begin 0600
AAV offload complete 0630
PEI LO/LO begins 0730
Throughput operation begins 0800
Container LO/LO begins 0830
13 May 92
Container LO/LO complete 1945
14 May 92
Container throughput complete 0500
PEI LO/LO complete 1015
Offload operations complete 1115
Throughput operations complete 1400
47
The SS Obregon (shown in Figure 15) deployed her stern
ramp in the amphibious position two hours prior to morning
twilight on 0-day. At first safe light, 13 Amphibious Assault
Vehicles (AAV) were launched via the stern ramp. Each AAV
contained three crewmen from the Marine Second Division. LCM-
8's were utilized as safety boats. AAV operations continued
for 35 minutes without incident. Following the splash of the
AAV's, NSE bulldozers were LO/LO'd from the main deck to the
lighterage and transported ashore.
Figure 15: SS Obregon stern ramp
Source: LT Barrett
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Principal End Items (PEI) and container offloads were
accomplished simultaneously during OV '92. The forward 50-ton
cranes were twinned up to offload PEI's in conjunction with
the aft pedestal 35-ton crane. Up to two barges were capable
of being loaded with PEI's at the same time. The container
offload was accomplished by lifting all of the containers over
the starboard side using the Morgan Gantry Crane. Figure 16
shows containers being unloaded over the side of the SS
Obregon
.




In accordance with the Arrival and Assembly Plan for OV
'92, the following PEIs were to be offloaded:
Second Deck — Drive selected vehicles from Holds 7
,
6, 5, 4, 4A, and 3A via 2nd deck ramp
to main deck for LO/LO.
58 FT FLAT — LO/LO PEIs in Holds 4, 4A, 5, and 6 via
Hatch cover #6. Remove Hatch cover #7
to 2nd deck.
Third Deck — Make selected heavy lifts from 2nd deck
via Hatch #7. Remainder of Holds 4, 4A,
and 5 will drive to main deck for
LO/LO.
16 FT 10 M Flat — Drive vehicles in this location to main
deck. Make selected heavy lifts
(LO/LO) from 2nd deck via Hatch #7.
TANK TOP — Drive three light units to main deck for
LO/LO.
CONTAINERS: Selected containers were offloaded in the
following sequence (Arrival and Assembly Plan for OV '92
Marines)
:
Hatch 5 Bay 2
Hatch 5 Bay 1
Hatch 4 Bay 2
Hatch 4 Bay 1
Hatch 2 Bay 1
Hatch 5 Bay 1
Hatch 4 Bay 1
Hatch 4 Bay 1
Hatch 3 Bay 2
Hatch 3 Bay 1
Hatch 2 Bay 2
Hatch 1 Bay 2
Hatch 1 Bay 1
In total, 271 PEIs were offloaded during the exercise, of
which 254 were on the designated MEU slice offload plan. The
other 17 not on the offload list were mistakenly offloaded.















91 were offloaded. There were 11 containers on the MEU slice
offload list that were not offloaded. Two containers were
mistakenly removed which were not on the list. Container
offload was completed at 1945 on 13 May. A total of 23 barge
sorties were required to offload the MEU slice. Two occurred
prior to 0-day to deliver the MHE to the beach. Of the
remaining 21 sorties, 13 carried PEI's, seven carried
containers, and one carried a mixed load. Only two LCM
sorties were conducted (CNA MPF OV '92)
.
Overall, offload operations were accomplished in
accordance with stated objectives. Based on exercise results,
the instream offload of the equipment and supplies in support
of a MEU slice can be completed within three days from
commencement of the offload.
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V. JLOTS OFFLOAD
A. GENERAL ORGANIZATION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
1. Command and Control
Prior to beginning a JLOTS operation, any ongoing
amphibious operation or MPF operation must be formally
terminated. To terminate an MPF operation: Marine Corps
command and control must be established ashore; adequate
equipment and supplies must have been offloaded and issued;
and the MAGTF Commander must state that he is combat ready.
Upon mutual agreement between the Navy Officer in Tactical
Control and the designated JLOTS Commander, or when directed
by the Joint Task Force Commander, the JLOTS Commander assumes
responsibility for JLOTS through the organization depicted in
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Figure 17: JLOTS Organization
Source: JCS Pub 4-03
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If the JLOTS operation commences under Navy component
control, the JLOTS ship-to-shore responsibility includes
operations as far as the beach high water mark. The cargo is
then turned over to forces ashore. Army offload elements are
integrated into the organization and are under operational
control of the Naval JLOTS Commander. If the JLOTS commences
under Army component control, JLOTS responsibilities extend to
delivering cargo to the receiving authority inland. As such,
the Army JLOTS Commander has responsibility for throughput
operations ashore.
The JLOTS Commander must ensure that offload systems
and embarked vehicles designated for discharge are prepared
prior to the start of discharge operations. An offload
preparation element will be designated to accomplish the
following:
1. Prepare lighterage, rolling stock, and cranes for
discharge.
2. Activate all ship to shore movement control systems.
3. Review offload plans with ships' and support forces
representatives
.
4. Recommend lighterage assignments.
Once preparations for discharge have been accom-
plished, the JLOTS Commander will designate the control of all
lighterage to be used during the offload based on either Navy
methods or Army methods.
Because of Service doctrine and administrative
differences, the responsibilities of the JLOTS Commander under
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Army or Navy control vary widely. Consequently, transitioning
from Naval component control to Army component control
requires extensive planning and coordination. Functions
occurring during this transition are shown in Table 4 . The
control organization shifts from the Offload Control Officer
(0C0) onboard the MPF ship to the Joint Lighterage Control
Center (JLCC) located on the beach. Lighterage control aboard
ship shifts from the Lighterage Control Officer (LCO) to a
Ship Lighterage Control Point (SLCP) . The Navy Beach Party
Team (BPT) becomes the Beach Lighterage Control Point (BLCP)
.
Transition operations may be affected by such factors as
weather and sea state.
TABLE 4
TRANSITION FUNCTIONS FOR LOTS/JLOTS

















BEACH BPT BPT BLCP
Source: JCS PUB 4-03
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Under Navy component control, an Offload Control
Officer will assign lighterage to each ship. Onboard each
ship, a Lighterage Control Officer (LCO) reports to the ship's
debarkation officer. The LCO directs the lighterage to the
appropriate positions alongside the ship for offload. Once
the lighterage is loaded, the LCO will inform the 0C0 who will
dispatch and control the lighterage during its movement to
shore
.
Under Army component control, the harbormaster
assigned to a terminal battalion is responsible for providing
lighterage control. A Joint Lighterage Control Center (JLCC)
is established ashore in a location which provides the best
visibility of lighterage operations on the beach. The JLCC
ensures safe lighterage operations, resolves disputes, manages
available craft, and controls lighterage entry and exit from
the operational area.
Lighterage Control Points (LCP) are set up on each
ship and on the beach. They are manned by Army watercraft
company personnel. The Ship Lighterage Control Point (SLCP)
directs lighterage from the queuing circle to the correct
location alongside the vessel. Once the lighterage is loaded,
it is sent to another queuing circle to contact the Beach
Lighterage Control Point (BLCP) . The BLCP will direct the
lighterage from the queuing circle to the correct lane for
discharge on the beach. Once discharged, the craft contacts
the SLCP for further instructions. An Army LCM 8 loaded with
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rolling stock is shown in Figure 18 leaving the queuing circle
for discharge on the beach.
Figure 18: Army LCM 8 leaving the FSS for discharge on beach
Source: LT Barrett
Ocean Venture '92 was the first test of the transition
of operational component control from the Navy to the Army.
Upon termination of MPF operations, the Naval component
56
commander, CNSE, assumed responsibilities as the JLOTS
Commander. The JLOTS offload began at this point. During
this period, the Army Task Force was under operational control
of the Navy JLOTS Commander. At 2000 hours, 15 May, the Navy
JLOTS Commander passed command to Commander, Seventh Transpor-
tation Group who became the JLOTS Commander for the duration
of the operation. The Commander of Naval Support Element and
his subordinate commands then fell under the operational
control of the Army JLOTS Commander. Figure 19 depicts the
organization during Naval component control and Figure 2
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Figure 19: JLOTS under Navy component control
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Figure 20: Jlots under Army component control
Source: Task Force 11 OV '92 OPORO 7-92
All of the Navy units listed independently in Figure
19 are consolidated into the box labeled Naval Support Unit
(NSU) on Figure 20. The Army units which comprise the 7th
Transportation Group box and the 11th Transportation Battalion
in Figure 19, are listed independently in Figure 20.
The Navy units which assist in a JLOTS exercise are
usually already in the exercise area supporting MPF or
amphibious operations prior to the start of the JLOTS portion
of the operation. The Army, however , must transit to the
exercise area before beginning operations. The Army performs
its JLOTS mission utilizing four phases:
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PREDEPLOYMENT - (Phase 1) The major components of the
predeployment phase are planning, training, rehearsal, and
inspection.
DEPLOYMENT - (Phase 2) Deployment activities begin upon
receipt of the Emergency Deployment Readiness order and
conclude on a predetermined date upon arrival of the last air
passenger into the area.
EMPLOYMENT - (PHASE 3) Employment encompasses the set up
for, and actual discharge, of all required cargo.
REDEPLOYMENT - (PHASE 4) Redeployment operations may
include site breakdown on the beach and ashore camp areas,
equipment upload on vessels as determined by exercise or
operation planners, air transport of personnel, and closeout
of the training area.
2. JLOTS Ship Characteristics
Strategic sealift is the principal means of delivery
for equipment and supplies to support land and air forces.
Sealift employed during JLOTS operations includes Military
Sealift Command common user ships and prepositioning ships.
Ocean Venture '92 utilized three self-sustaining common user
ships capable of discharging cargo directly to lighterage for
transfer ashore. These ships included a sea barge or SEABEE
ship, a Roll on/Roll off (RO/RO) ship, and an Auxiliary Crane
Ship (T-ACS)
.
The SEABEE ship has three decks on which cargo barges
or container flats are stowed. Barges are brought to each
deck by a stern elevator and are moved internally by a barge
transporter. Two barges can be loaded or unloaded in a cycle
of about 4 minutes. SEABEE barge ships carry up to 38 barges
with an elevator capacity of 2,000 long tons. The SEABEE ship
is the preferred ship to transport Landing Craft Utility
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(LCUs) and lighter amphibious resupply cargo vehicles. in
addition, the SEABEE ship may carry tugs, stacked causeway
sections, air cushioned vehicles, and other watercraft and
heavy lift equipment to support a JLOTS operation. (JCS PUB
4)
Figure 21 displays the stow plan for the lighterage to
be transported aboard the SEABEE ship, discharged, and used
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Pigure 21: Lighterage stow plan for SEABEE ship OV '92
Source: TasX Force 11 OV '92 OPORD 7-92
60
RO/RO ships are the preferred mode of transporting
tracked or wheeled combat equipment to an operation area. A
RO/RO Discharge Facility (RRDF) provides the means of
debarking vehicles from the RO/RO ship. The RRDF consists of
six CSNP intermediate sections joined together to form a
modular platform. Vehicles are driven from the ship to the
platform and then onto lighterage for transit ashore. The
RRDF requires the services of one SLWT and one CSP for
assembly, operation, and maintenance. Assembly time is
approximately 6 to 8 hours and requires a crew of 19 to
assemble, as well as a crew of 12 to operate and maintain.
A Military Sealift Command Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) was
used as the RO/RO vessel for Ocean Venture '92. In addition
to utilizing its RO/RO capabilities, the ship also used its
cranes for LO/LO discharge and functioned as the test platform
for the new Army High Sea State Container Transfer System
(HISEACOTS) offload facility. Figure 22 displays an LCU at
the LO/LO discharge point, a Lighter Air Cushioned Vehicle
(LACV 30) at the HISEACOTS discharge point, an LCU at the RRDF
platform and the lighterage queuing circles for the FSS
download.
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Figure 22: F88 Download OV '92
Source: Task Force 11 OV '92 OPORD 7-92
Figure 23 shows the FSS download in progress during OV
'92. The LSV is loading on the starboard side of the FSS and
the HISEACOTS system is discharging containers on the port
side.
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Figure 23: FSS operations OV '92
Source: LT Barrett
Auxiliary Crane Ships (T-ACS) serve two purposes in
support of JLOTS operations. First, they function as crane
ships with the ability to offload other non-self sustaining
containerships. Secondly, they have the capability of
carrying 20 and 40 foot cargo containers as well as outsized
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cargo and vehicles. Containers may be offloaded by the T-ACS
cranes using the 20 or 40 foot spreader bars. Outside support
is not required except for the Navy Cargo Handling Force,
lighterage crews, and Army terminal service company personnel.
Offload operations will be directed by the JLOTS Commander.
After container offload, the ship will be prepared to offload
other container ships as required.
Figures 24 and 25 depict the container and lighterage
T-ACS stowplans for OV '92.
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Figure 24: T-ACS Container Stowplan OV '92
Source: Task Force 11 OV '92 OPORD 7-92
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Figure 25: T-ACS Lighterage Stovplan ov '92
Source: Task Force 11 OV '92 OPORD 7-92
3. Lighterage Assets
Lighterage assets organic to naval LOTS include the
landing craft and causeway sections discussed in Chapter IV.
Additional types of lighterage are available for JLOTS offload
operations. The selection of lighterage type is dependent
upon weather, sea state, beach gradient, and characteristics
of the onload and discharge sites. The following additional
types of lighterage were utilized during OV '92:
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a. Landing Craft, Utility (LCU 1600 Class) Navy LCUs
are attached to Assault Craft Units, and Army LCUs are
assigned to transportation heavy boat companies. LCUs can
transport containers, breakbulk cargo, RO/RO cargo, outsized
cargo, and personnel. They are capable of beaching and
retracting under their own power. The 1600 class is a twin
screw vessel powered by two diesel engines. The pilot house
and crew quarters are located on the starboard side which
allows vehicles full drive through from the stern to the bow















Figure 26: Landing Craft Utility (1600)
Source: JCS Pub 4-03
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b. Landing Craft, Utility (LCU 2000 Class) LCU 2000
class LCUs are organic to the Army and are attached to trans-
portation heavy boat companies. They are the largest and
newest class LCU and are capable of transporting personnel,
containers, and other cargo. The 2000 class is also a twin
screw vessel powered by two diesel engines. The engine room
and crew quarters are located aft; therefore cargo must be
loaded and discharged via the bow ramp or by crane. Figure 27














Figure 27: Landing Craft Utility (2000)
Source: Jcs Pub 4-03
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c. Lighter Air Cushion Vehicle, 30 TON (LACV-30)
The Army LACV-30 is a fully amphibious high speed craft which
uses aircraft turbine engines to provide lift and forward
thrust for its hollow aluminum hull. It is very maintenance
and fuel intensive but it has the advantage of being able to
cross 70% of the worlds beaches. Separate water entry and
exit points should be established on the beach for the LACV to
protect other equipment from the sand and air blown up by the
air cushion. Figure 28 depicts a LACV 30.
Capacity 23 TONS
Crew 6
Length 7 9 / 5 ii
Beam 36'11 M
Draft (full load)
Max Speed, light 50 KNOTS
Figure 28: Army LACV 30
Source: JC8 Pub 4-03
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d. Logistics Support Vessel (LSV) The LSV transports
approximately 2000 ST of dry cargo in coastal, harbor, and
inland waterways. It also possesses a beaching capability
permitting its use in JLOTS operations. The roll on/roll off
design permits rapid discharge of mobile unit equipment.
B. OCEAN VENTURE '92 JLOTS OFFLOAD
1. Mission
The primary mission of the Exercise Ocean Venture '92
JLOTS portion was to conduct a rapid, efficient, and effective
instream discharge of 746 pieces of a 24th Infantry Division
Mechanized Brigade off the Fast Sealift Ship USNS Pollux
within 72 hours. The ancillary mission was to discharge and
recycle onboard 200 containers from the Auxiliary Crane Ship
USNS Flickertail State within 96 hours.
Unlike the Navy, the Army timeline in this particular
scenario was delineated using the acronym "C day" vice the
Navy "O day" which was discussed in Chapter IV. The Army
selected 30 April 1992 as C-day indicating the start of
deployment activities. This is significantly different from
the interpretation of O-day by the Navy. The Navy utilizes
the term O-day to begin counting the days of actual offload
time.
Army exercise execution and preparation was conducted
during the following four phases:
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a. Predeployment Phase
Predeployment activities began 18 November 1991
with the issuance of a verbal warning order from the Commander
of the Army Seventh Transportation Group and continued through
30 April 1992. The major components of this phase included
planning, training, rehearsal, and inspection. The planning
process occurred between 18 November 1991 and 6 April 1992.
USCINCLANT planning conferences were held as well as 7th
Transportation Group conferences.
Training requirements were identified in January
1992 with the development of task lists by individual units of
training to be accomplished prior to the start of the
exercise. Critical tasks identified in the task lists were
rehearsed prior to deployment by practicing stowage of
watercraft aboard the Seabee ship SS Cape Mohican.
Inspections of equipment, lighterage, and personnel were
conducted from 27 April 1992 until 1 May 1992 (C-3 to C+l)
.
b. Deployment Phase
Deployment activities commenced 3D April 1992 (C
day) with the initiation of the 7th Transportation Group OV
'92 Emergency Deployment Readiness Alert and continued until
the arrival of the last air passenger at Marine Corps Air
Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, on 13 May 1992.
Deployment/upload operations included the following:
1. Seabee/SS Cape Mohican:
29 April-4 May 1992 at Hampton Roads, Virginia.
21 watercraft and 19 causeway sections were loaded.
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2. T-ACS/USNS Flickertail State:
Arrived Hampton Roads, Virginia for upload 6 May 1992.




746 pieces of 24th Infantry Division equipment
Savannah, Georgia were loaded.
4. In addition, on 7 May 1992 at Hampton Roads, Virginia,
other Army unit equipment was nested onboard six LCU-
2000's and the LSV-1 for transport to the exercise area.
On 10 May 1992, the Seabee ship, the T-ACS, and
the LCU-2000s departed Hampton Roads and transited to Onslow
Beach, North Carolina. The Army Task Force Advance Party
departed by convoy to the exercise area. On 11 May, the
remaining self-deploying watercraft left Virginia for Onslow
Beach and arrived 12 May 1992. Equipment and personnel
deploying by air from Naval Air Station, Norfolk to Marine
Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina commenced 11
May 1992 and was completed on 13 May 1992.
c. Employment Phase
Phase III employment encompassed the set up for
and actual discharge of the 24th Infantry unit -equipment from
the FSS ship USNS Pollux and the download/upload of containers
from the T-ACS SS Flickertail State. Discharge operations
included:
1. Seabee: 11-13 May 21 watercraft/19 causeway sections
2. T-ACS: 11-12 May 16 causeway strings
16-18 May 46 containers/11 discharged ashore
3. FSS: 15-16 May 561 pieces (Onslow Beach)
17-18 May 185 pieces (Morehead City,NC)
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A more detailed timeline and discussion of offload
operations can be found in Section 2 of this chapter.
d. Redeployment Phase
Redeployment activities began upon the conclusion
of the FSS discharge on 17 May and the termination of
container recycling 18 May onboard the T-ACS. The FSS
departed Morehead City at high tide on 18 May. Seabee
redeployment efforts commenced 14 May but were halted for 48
hours due to high sea states. The vessel was then relocated
for upload to the sheltered waters of Beaufort Inlet/Cape
Lookout. The T-ACS was also relocated to Cape Lookout after
completing one day of upload operations. Passenger and ground
evacuation of unit equipment commenced 19 May and concluded 23
May 1992. Redeployment and upload operations are summarized
below:
1. Seabee: 18-19 May 2 LACV 30s (Onslow Beach)
20-23 May 16 craft/ 19 causeways
(Cape Lookout)
2. T-ACS: 19 May 46 containers




Set up and site preparation for the JLOTS offload
began 10 May 1992 (C+10) upon the arrival of the Task Force
advance party. Advance party personnel initiated logistical
support operations, opening of contracts, and established
initial FM and multichannel communications.
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The SEABEE ship, SS Cape Mohican, arrived 11 May 1992
and was met by Task Force stevedores and lighterage crews and
commenced discharge. Download priority was SLWTs, causeway
sections, LCMs, LCUs, and LACV 30s. T-ACS ship, Flickertail
State, arrived 11 May 1992 and discharged her causeway
sections. The causeway sections were completely assembled by
12 May 1992 to form the RRDF platform. The RRDF platform was
emplaced on the FSS upon her arrival 14 May 1992. The RRDF
platform can be seen in Figure 29 emplaced on the starboard
side of the FSS with rolling stock awaiting pick up by
lighterage.
Figure 29: FSS RRDF OV '92
Source: LT Barrett
Table 5 is the timeline of significant events for the
JLOTS offload portion of OV '92.
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TABLE 5










Seabee Ship discharge complete
FSS arrives/anchors







FSS lowers ramp to RRDF
FSS RO/RO discharge begins
HISEACOTS moved from FSS to T-ACS
JLOTS control passed to Army








FSS RO/RO ops completed





FSS LO/LO ops terminated
11 LCUs and LSV underway for Morehead City
FSS underway for Morehead City
T-ACS container ops stopped
First tank off FSS, Morehead City
All lighterage enroute to Onslow Beach
with MlAls/M88s














The 24th Infantry division deployed a total of 746
cargo pieces: 420 wheeled vehicles, 310 tracked vehicles, 5
aircraft, and 11 pieces of general cargo on the FSS. 561
pieces or seventy-five percent of the FSS vessel load was
discharged in the first thirty hours of operation. An LCU
2000 can be seen in Figure 30 loading at the aft end of the
RRDF platform on the FSS while an LCM 8 is loaded at the
forward end of the RRDF during OV '92.
Figure 30: LCU 2000 and LCM 8 loading at the FSS OV '92
Source: LT Barrett
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An equipment malfunction of the forward Haaglund crane
on the FSS resulted in a delay in LO/LO operations at the 30
hour point. Additionally, it was determined that the FSS ramp
could not offload the M1A1 tanks offshore due to ramp
certification load limits. The M1A1 tanks were 6.25 short
tons over ramp capacity. Consequently, the FSS was forced to
move to fixed port facilities. The remaining 56 tracks and
130 wheels/trailers in the aft cells were downloaded at the
Morehead City state-owned pier and transported via LCU and
convoy to Onslow Beach within 66 hours of the start of the
exercise.
Two hundred empty containers were loaded aboard the T-
ACS in Gulfport, Mississippi. At the exercise area, 46 of the
200 containers, or 23 percent, were discharged from the T-ACS
between 16 and 18 May 1992. Container operations onboard the
T-ACS suffered for two reasons. Heavy pendulation caused by
the rolling of the T-ACS which was induced by the sea state
and exacerbated by the empty ship bunkers caused the container
offload to be stopped for long periods of time. In addition,
the T-ACS offload was the lowest priority during the exercise.
Thus the larger, heavier lighterage able to maneuver in heavy
seas were assigned to the FSS offload. The smaller LCM-8s
available to the T-ACS were unable to handle the weather and
the amount of containers to be offloaded. Eventually, the
Master of the T-ACS refused to allow anything smaller then the
LCU 2000 alongside to receive containers. (11th TBL After
Action Report, 1992)
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The execution of the Ocean Venture '92 JLOTS phase was
deemed a success. The primary mission, to discharge the FSS
within 72 hours (15-18 May) , was accomplished despite
aggravating conditions caused by equipment malfunctions and
rolling seas. Container operations may have achieved equal
success if the T-ACS had relocated to sheltered waters.
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VI. LESSONS LEARNED
Although Ocean Venture '92 was considered a successful
joint operation overall, there are areas which require further
examination. This chapter will identify and discuss these
areas of concern and present recommendations for improvement.
The issue identification and discussion material used in this
chapter is a consolidation of information received from the
After Action Reports, references 7, 9, 12, 13; interviews,
references 17-25; and the author's personal observations
during the exercise.
A. ISSUE 1: TRAINING DEFICIENCIES NEGATIVELY IMPACTED
OFFLOAD OPERATIONS
DISCUSSION: The inexperience of the lighterage crews,
crane operators and offload control personnel was a primary
factor constraining MPF offload operations. Most of the
personnel were reservists who had received very little
practical training in the year prior to the exercise. Due to
Desert Storm, training exercises for 1991 were canceled.
Reserve personnel also did not have access to Morgan gantry
cranes for practice prior to the exercise. The initial lack
of experience resulted in delays in assembling barges and
loading of lighterage. Conflicts arose when lighterage crews
and stevedores disagreed on craft weight limitations and
placement of equipment on the lighterage. The lack of
78
experience was reflected in the low rate of barge utilization
due to inefficient barge loading.
In addition, many of the boat and Causeway Section,
Powered (CSP) crews had problems maneuvering their craft and
avoiding engine and mechanical difficulties. Valuable offload
time was wasted waiting for craft to come alongside the ship.
Failed attempts resulted in damage to the MPF ships as the
boats collided with the ships' hulls. Over 50% of the
lighterage units used in OV '92 had to be offloaded upon
exercise completion to repair the damage they sustained.
Several times, ships' crews refused to allow craft alongside
until they had practiced elsewhere first. The craft would
practice on their own without supervision or training, then
return to the ship to try again.
Officers and NCOs participating in both MPF and JLOTS
portions lacked knowledge of basic skills in seamanship and
terminal service operations. During JLOTS, officers with no
knowledge or background in watercraft operations were assigned
to command units with ocean-going vessels. Officers assigned
as MPF Lighterage Offload Control Officers responsible for
directing the offload were not properly trained prior to the
exercise. In one case, an offload officer was briefed
regarding his duties while awaiting transportation to the
offload site.
LE880N8 LEARNED: Major MPF exercises should be the
culmination of a year long training program. These
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opportunities should focus on demonstrating instead of
developing proficiency. Experienced active duty people should
be available to provide supervision and additional training as
needed to craft and crane operators experiencing difficulty.
Officers in command of watercraft units and offload control
personnel are vital to the success of the mission and require
extensive training.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Some training improvements for OV '93
have been initiated. COMPSRON ONE ships were brought to
Norfolk, Virginia, during the summer of 1992 to provide
training opportunities to reservists. Reservists spent
weekend drills and active duty for training periods operating
the ship's cranes and practicing maneuvering the lighterage.
Continued funding of reserve training needs to be a
priority in order to maintain skills and readiness.
During the exercise, experienced craftmasters should also
be assigned to each shift to rotate among the craft, observe
boathandling skills, and provide in-depth on-the-spot
training.
B. ISSUE 2: ARMY/NAVY INTEROPERABILITY
DISCUSSION: Signalling procedures for guiding vessels to
the discharge pier or the beach are significantly different in
each service. The Army watercraft appeared to interpret the
beachmasters' hand signals as literal engine/rudder orders.
The Navy uses the signals only as broad guidelines to assist
the craftmaster as needed.
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The Navy prefers to use the same fuel for its watercraft
as is available on the MPS ships. The Army, however, prefers
to use a different fuel which they can get only via a tank
located on shore. Shore refueling is a hazardous operation,
especially in high seas.
Crew shift hours are different. The Army allows its
individual units to determine when crew shifts will occur.
The Navy does all crew shifts at one time for its units.
Problems surfaced because of limited craft available to do
crew changes.
The Army does not have a Beachmaster unit to control beach
offload, thus they must rely on the Navy Beachmaster Team.
The Navy Beachmaster Team controls all lighterage as it comes
to the beach without any input from the Navy component control
organization. However, under Army component control, the JLCC
directs that all craft report to them as well as the
Beachmasters . Therefore, as the craft approaches the beach,
the craftmaster is receiving direction from both organizations
and trying to respond to both organizations.- This caused
confusion, delays, and hard feelings from some of the
craftmasters
.
LESSONS LEARNED: Interservice interoperability is the key
to a successful joint offload operation. Training together
and prior planning can alleviate frustrating problems.
Services must identify procedures that best facilitate the
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joint mission and adopt them as the way of doing business for
all services.
RECOMMENDATIONS: There is no substitute for pre-operation
training with exercise participants. Terminology and doctrine
differences should be identified and resolved prior to the
operation. The Army and Navy watercraft units should take
advantage of their close proximity to each other in the
Virginia Beach area and practice beaching operations and
lighterage control.
C. ISSUE 3: JL0T8 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS WERE INADEQUATE
DISCUSSION: Communication equipment and number of
frequencies were insufficient to support the JLOTS mission.
The 7th Transportation Group planned and published a Signal
Operating Instruction (SOI) prior to the exercise. For
simplicity, the 7th Transportation Group decided to keep the
same call signs and frequencies throughout Ocean Venture '92,
operating in non-secure mode only. One primary frequency was
provided for each unit.
Army doctrine dictates the use of an approved Signal
Operating Instruction (SOI) . This SOI controls daily changing
of frequencies, call signs, codes, and net authentications.
The Navy does not follow the same doctrine, thus it was unable
to effectively use the Army SOI.
Net discipline was lacking. Transmissions were too long
and critical information was sent in the clear. This included
commanders' names, unit locations, and movements.
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The task force and harbormaster frequencies were heavily
used. Most watercraft were overusing channel 74 on the marine
band radio. Craft did not switch from this frequency to speak
to the JLCC as the SOI instructed. Exercise participants did
not understand the command and control structure and thus were
unable to use the communication plan appropriately.
LESSONS LEARNED: Insufficient equipment, overcrowding of
frequencies, poor radio procedures, and poor understanding of
command and control caused significant communication problems.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Comprehensive communication training
must be provided to all participants on net discipline,
utilizing an SOI, and security discipline. A joint letter of
instruction should be promulgated addressing and resolving
these issues
.
D. ISSUE 4: MPF OFFLOAD COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT WAS
INADEQUATE
DISCUSSION: Communication equipment available to the
units offloading the MPF ship was incompatible. Radio
crystals inside the Cargo Handling Battalion radios,
lighterage radios, Marine offload team radios, and the
Lighterage Control Officer's radios did not match. Therefore,
these organizations, which control the offload, were unable to
communicate with each other. This caused significant delays
bringing craft alongside and coordinating cargo discharge. It
also presented a potentially dangerous situation because
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Marines in the lower holds could not notify ship personnel in
the event of a medical emergency.
LESSONS LEARNED: Coordination must occur prior to an
exercise between offload units to determine interoperability
of communication equipment. Delays and potentially dangerous
situations can result from the lack of compatible equipment.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Each of the radios in question have
vacant ports available internally to place additional radio
crystals. The operation plan delineating exercise communi-
cation frequencies should identify matching radio crystals and
frequencies. The units must purchase and install the crystals
prior to the exercise.
E. ISSUE 5: OFFLOAD CHAIN OF COMMAND AND LIGHTERAGE CONTROL
NEEDS REEVALUATING
DISCUSSION: The chain of command during the MPF offload
was too long to efficiently accomplish the offload. For
example, it took almost four minutes to relay a message from
the Chief Mate of the vessel, standing on the main deck, to
the Lighterage Control Officer, on the bridge- wing, to stop
the approach of an incoming craft.
Other problems ensued when the Lighterage Control Officer
informed the craft alongside awaiting cargo to prepare for the
wrong cargo. The cargo was actually being offloaded to a
craft on the other side. Such communication delays could
result in injuries or equipment damage.
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JLOTS lighterage control was ineffective due to
conflicting tasks being issued from the various lighterage
control elements. This included the ship control personnel
giving instructions different from the Joint Lighterage
Control Center and outside entities, such as VIPs
appropriating craft for their own use. In addition, there was
inefficient use of the lighterage as evidenced by long queue
waits in the lighterage queuing circles and congested waters
around the piers and beach.
LESSONS LEARNED: An efficient and clear chain of command
is vital to a successful offload. It is imperative that
personnel on the main deck have direct communications with the
craftmasters
.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The Lighterage Control Officer should
bring the craft alongside the ship. Once alongside, the cargo
handlers and craftmasters should speak directly to each other
to facilitate the offload. The Army should review its
lighterage control procedures and streamline them into a
system similar to the Navy's. This would simplify their
communication plan and lessen confusion between Navy and Army
units operating together.
F. ISSUE 6: JOINT LIGHTERAGE CONTROL CENTER WAS UNDERMANNED
AND UNDEREQUIPPED
DISCUSSION: The Joint Lighterage Control Center (JLCC)
was manned and equipped with "excess" assets from the 11th
Transportation Battalion. Thus, each 12 hour shift was manned
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only by two personnel (one officer and one E-7) . As discussed
in Chapter V, the JLCC is the hub for the JLOTS offload.
Maintaining the status of all vessels and keeping track of all
radio frequencies was an enormous task. The shifts lasted
from 12 to 18 hours to ensure a smooth transition and to
accomplish the mission. Although undermanned, the JLCC
accomplished the mission due to the high quality of personnel
assigned who were able to overcome the shortfalls.
The JLCC possessed only two radios to monitor all traffic.
The radios and mounts are not part of the Table of Organiza-
tion and Equipment, and were therefore borrowed from other
units. Due to the long lead time of the exercise this was
possible, but in a crisis situation radios could be difficult
or impossible to acquire.
The JLCC facility was adequate for a small exercise, but
not for a "real" mission. Larger scale operations would
require more personnel than the work space could physically
accommodate. The JLCC was located too far away from other
organizations and did not have access to a vehicle. This
prohibited staff members from attending all of the operations
meetings and keeping abreast of changes. Also, the JLCC was
dependent on others for resupply (such as fuel for the
generators) due to lack of a vehicle.
LESSONS LEARNED: The workload for a JLOTS offload
justifies that more personnel and equipment be assigned to the
JLCC. The JLCC is the focal point of any such exercise, and
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it must be given the opportunity to operate at maximum
efficiency.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The JLCC needs a minimum of two more
personnel, preferably trained radio operators. A reevaluation
of the communication equipment Table of Organization and
Equipment should be conducted to request funds for the
purchase of radios specifically for the JLCC. In addition,
the JLCC could be placed in a shop trailer with more space for
radios as well as a weather facsimile machine. The JLCC also
needs to be assigned a dedicated vehicle. For future JLOTS
operations, the personnel should continue to be the best and
most knowledgeable professionals, preferably with previous
JLOTS experience.
0. ISSUE 7: COMMUNICATION PLAN NOT DISSEMINATED PROPERLY
DISCUSSION: Lack of knowledge of the communication plan
was observed in both the MPF and JLOTS portions of the
exercise. For the first 16 hours of the MPF exercise, the
lighterage control communications plan was unknown to most
participants. The plan had been verbally briefed to some
watercraft operators several days prior to the offload, but
upon exercise execution the watercraft did not have a hard
copy communications plan onboard their vessels. This resulted
in confusion at all levels and, ultimately, in the delay of
lighterage moving to the shore.
The same problem occurred at the start of the JLOTS
portion. Craft coming alongside the ships did not know the
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correct frequencies to accomplish the mission. Consequently,
delays were encountered in moving offload crews to the ship,
moving fenders into position, and moving from the queuing
circles into offload positions.
LESSONS LEARNED: All exercise participants must be aware
of the communications plan prior to the start of the exercise.
The plan should be thoroughly discussed and rehearsed to
develop proficiency. This would enable the initial offload to
begin more smoothly while lessening participant frustration.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The communication plan must be
distributed prior to the exercise. Department heads and
Company Commanders should check their craft to ensure
communication plans are onboard. A Communications Officer
should be appointed and be a visible figure, available to
resolve any issue as soon as it develops.
H. ISSUE 8: INABILITY TO CONDUCT SHIFT CHANGES HAMPERED THE
OFFLOAD AND IMPACTED MORALE
DISCUSSION: During the MPF portion of the exercise, the
boat crews were scheduled to work 12 hour shifts. Initial
crew changes were accomplished by sending one LCM-8 with the
relief crews around to each craft for turnover. This process
took several hours to complete, which meant the crews were
spending up to 18 hours on the water vice 12 . No one in the
Offload Control Center had planned ahead for crew changes, so
the lighterage were randomly transiting to the beach or
loading alongside the ship. Consequently, the LCM 8 trying to
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accomplish crew turnover was chasing the lighterage as the
lighterage was in transit. If the lighterage was loading at
the ship either the offload had to stop until turnover was
accomplished or the LCM 8 had to wait until the craft was
loaded before crew changes occurred. In either case, delays
and hard feelings resulted. No one was coordinating personnel
to ensure enough crew members arrived for each new shift. On
several occasions personnel worked double shifts because they
had no relief.
In the JLOTS portion, the same issue again occurred.
Aggravating the problem was the VIPs commandeering of the LCM-
8s assigned for crew shifts for their personal transportation.
Shifts stretched from 12 to 20 hours. Morale plummeted and
fatigue set in. In addition, the boat crew shift times were
different from the shift times for personnel onboard the
vessels. This added to the confusion because no one knew who
was leaving and when. Eventually, the problem was alleviated
somewhat by bringing all of the craft to the beach for shift
change. The disadvantage of this method was the inability to
offload cargo when all of the boats were on the beach for crew
change
.
LESSONS LEARNED: Forethought and planning are necessary
for smooth turnover periods. Mission accomplishment
deteriorates when personnel become fatigued, frustrated, and
miss meals. Operations Officers must be aware at all times
where the craft are, and make decisions prior to the 12 hour
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mark on how best to accomplish the turnover. Crew turnover
periods can only be staggered with prior planning and if all
exercise personnel understand the program.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Assign a junior officer to be on the
beach during crew changes. This officer will muster the boat
crews on the beach, ensuring enough reliefs have arrived prior
to the 12 hour mark. The officer can also check that all crew
members have the required personnel safety gear. VIP trans-
portation should be scheduled not to conflict with crew
changes. Timely crew changes are imperative to the overall
success of the mission. Operations officers must become
proactive in this area instead of reactive.
I. ISSUE 9: MPF SHIPS ARE VULNERABLE TO SMALL BOAT
TERRORIST THREAT
DISCUSSION: Although MPF operations are doctrinal ly
operating in a benign environment, they are still vulnerable
to small boat terrorist threats. The size of an MPF ship
makes it impossible for the offload personnel to see divers or
small boats alongside the ship's hull. Only one LCU was used
for seaward security during the OV '92 operation. "Enemy"
forces were able to penetrate this security and plant an
explosive device on the hull of the MPF ship. The explosive
was "detonated" before being discovered and the ship was
"lost". Halfway through the exercise, the Naval Support
Element (NSE) was allowed to borrow the Rigid Hull Inflatable
Boat (RHIB) from the MPF operating company. MPF NSE crews
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were then able to locate and remove three exercise explosive
devices from the hull of one of the MPF ships. The boat was
used for the remainder of the exercise to make periodic hull
checks
.
LESSONS LEASHED: All personnel require a greater
awareness of potential terrorist threats. Other LCUs in the
area could have been used for security. The RHIB boat was
effectively used to make security checks.
RECOMMENDATIONS: All personnel should receive a security
briefing prior to arriving in the exercise area. Greater use
needs to be made of all available assets in the area. In
addition, a contractual agreement should be made with the
ship's operating company for the NSE to use the RHIB boat
until Navy RHIBs can be added to the MPF inventory.
J. ISSUE 10: EXCESS PERSONNEL ON SHIPS CAUSED COAST GUARD
VIOLATIONS AND BERTHING PROBLEMS
DISCUSSION: Every merchant vessel carries a Coast Guard
certification which denotes the maximum number of people
authorized onboard the vessel at any one time. -The SS Obregon
certification allows 180 people to be onboard. During an MPF
operation, the number of personnel onboard expands to include
the NSE staff, offload crews, vehicle drivers, and stevedores.
Ships are certified to hold only the minimum number of
personnel required to complete the offload.
The MPF ships have a reputation for great food, hot
showers, and comfortable staterooms. Thus, during OV '92, the
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CMPF staff requested berthing onboard rather than berthing on
one of the amphibious ships in the area. VIPs watching the
exercise also requested last minute berthing space. Extra
reserve officers on the exercise for training requested
berthing. In addition, all units sent extra personnel to the
ship to observe and take advantage of the hands-on training
opportunity the exercise provided.
As a result, the number of personnel rose to approximately
220 while the COMSPRON ONE staff attempted to make hourly head
counts to keep track of personnel. The Offload Control
Officer and staff responsible for the ship's offload was
relocated to another MPF ship in the area. If this had been
a true MEU slice operation, no other MPF ship would have been
available to provide berthing. Several NSE officers slept on
the weather decks of the SS Obregon.
The ship's Master requested that extra personnel depart
the ship and live on the beach. He also requested a temporary
waiver from the Coast Guard to increase the certification
numbers. The waiver was granted when he demonstrated the ship
carried enough life rafts and safety equipment.
LESSONS LEARNED: While it is important that as many
people receive training as possible, personnel numbers should
be established based on the type of offload being conducted.
For a MEU slice operation, a full ship offload team is not
required. Berthing assignments should be based solely on task
assigned.
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RECOMMENDATIONS: Communication between all units working
onboard the ship and those desiring berthing during the
exercise must occur prior to the exercise. Limits on the
number of personnel authorized onboard should also be
identified in advance. The NSE Commander should have the
authority to enforce the limits. In addition, the ship should
request a permanent increase in the Coast Guard certification
to the number of personnel required for a standard offload.
Visitors and observers should be shuttled to the ship to watch
without adversely impacting operations, then berth elsewhere
at night.
K. ISSUE 11: IMPACT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENT ON OPERATIONS
DISCUSSION: Onslow Beach is not well suited for the
offload of commercial vessels instream due to the shallow
gradient. The MPS ship anchored approximately four miles off
the beach in order to achieve sufficient water depth for a
safe anchorage. The JLOTS shipping was anchored approximately
one mile further out. Night operations were also difficult,
since there was a relatively low percentage of illumination
from the moon.
LOTS operations are inherently weather dependent. Sea
state played a major role in the operation as sea state three
was reached on several occasions.
During the JLOTS portion of the exercise, the Army used
its risk management program effectively to determine the
impact of the environment on the operation. Risk management
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provided guidelines to exercise personnel responsible for
safely conducting the exercise. Appendix E contains the risk
assessment forms for OV '92.
LESSONS LEARNED: Ship to shore movement is an inherently
risky evolution. The impact of the environment, especially
the effects of wind and sea on lighters, is well documented
and must be included in the planning process.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The Navy and Marine Corps should adopt
a risk management system similar to the Army's. Environmental
concerns should be reassessed continuously during the exercise
to allow for a safe operation.
L. ISSUE 12: SAFETY
DISCUSSION: When adequate supervision was on station,
safety regulations were followed. There were some instances
where under-supervised troops ignored regulations concerning
the wearing of personal protective equipment such as hard hats
and work vests.
Safety Observers were frequently pulled from their
assignments to temporarily fill other billets, then returned
to their posts. Consequently, they suffered from sleep
deprivation and were not sufficiently alert to safety
violations.
Army watercraft personnel wear deck shoes vice steel-toed
shoes. Navy personnel all wear steel-toed shoes. An injury
that occurred to a sailor would have been permanently
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disabling had he not had on steel-toed shoes. Army and Navy
personnel were performing the same tasks.
Personnel transfers from the small boats to the merchant
ships were not conducted safely. In one instance, an LCU crew
was holding the bottom of the ladder while a sailor went up to
the ship. The LCU drifted from the side of the ship and the
LCU crew was forced to release the ladder. This caused the
sailor to impact the side of the ship and sustain minor
injuries. Sea state also aggravated the difficulty of
personnel transfers as increasing swells caused further ladder
difficulties.
During the JLOTs portion, Army personnel stood under
equipment as it was lowered over the side. If the equipment
had dropped, personnel would have been crushed.
The Navy conducted daily safety stand downs to inspect
lines and patch holes in craft. The Army did not allow stand
down time to perform safety checks. Army craft were allowed
to operate even when taking on water through small holes.
LESSONS LEARNED: Safety must be the number one priority
at all times. Safety Officers and Observers must be not be
pulled to do other jobs; they must be assigned and available
to enforce regulations. Each service has certain tasks and
procedures that it performs more safely than the others.
RECOMMENDATIONS: The use of a pilot's ladder is not
always the safest method of transfer from the watercraft used
in a JLOTS environment. Improvements in this area have
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already been enacted. During OV '93, a causeway section
(modular type) will be moored alongside each merchant ship to
allow safer transfer of personnel.
Consistent application of regulations across service lines
should be a priority. Army personnel need safety shoes and
should perform daily craft safety inspections. All personnel
need safety reminder briefings throughout an exercise
especially in the area of offload procedures. Each service
can learn things from the other.
M. ISSUE 13: NAVY AND ARMY UNITS HAVE REDUNDANT CAPABILITIES
DISCUSSION: Navy and Army offload units have similar
capabilities. Instead of fighting each other over turf and
procedures, it would make economical sense to combine the
service offload units into a permanent joint team or have one
service designated to conduct the operation.
LESSONS LEARNED: The requirement for both the Army and
the Navy to offload vessels instream should be reevaluated.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Review offload requirements and
determine the best service or combinations of services to
conduct offload operations to alleviate redundant
capabilities.
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Sealift has been, and continues to be, the primary means
of providing U.S. forces overseas with the requisite supplies
and equipment to sustain operations. Efficient Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) and Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS)
exercises are crucial to the success of American involvement
during real crisis situations.
LOTS refers to the loading and unloading of ships without
benefit of fixed port facilities. These operations are
generally conducted in areas where there are unimproved
shorelines, ports partially destroyed by combat action,
shallow draft ports not accessible to deep draft vessels, or
other inadequate ports where supplemental LOTS capability is
necessary to bring supplies ashore. The operations may be
conducted from a few hundred yards to several miles offshore.
When the operation involves more than one service component,
i.e., the Navy (and/or Marines) and the Army, it is referred
to as Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS)
.
In an effective JLOTS operation the JLOTS Commander
synchronizes all efforts to maintain continuity in the flow of
operations. The goal is to safely and efficiently discharge
cargo to the correct unit(s) ashore. This requires tremendous
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coordination of effort, concise communication, and dedicated
teamwork.
Operation Desert Shield was the first time the MPF concept
was utilized on a large scale; the ships equipped and
sustained a Marine force of over 30,000. This also provided
an opportunity to evaluate the entire MPF evolution from the
initial decision to use the capability to restocking the used
equipment and supplies afterwards.
One of the lessons learned from Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm was that these huge ships could be
configured in a variety of ways depending on the anticipated
need. One alternative is to "spreadload, " which means
disbursing the supplies evenly so that all of the ships in
each squadron have approximately the same load. This is most
effective in a large scale operation where the intent is to
offload most or all of the equipment.
Another alternative is to configure the ships based on the
Marine force module concept. This allows more flexibility for
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) by positioning
equipment into sections of the ships in order to offload a
specific required portion. Selection of a ship to support a
Marine operation is based on which ship has the desired
configuration to support the mission. Effective logistics
planning results in an efficient offload of equipment and




Ocean Venture '92 was a JLOTS operation conducted from 11
May to 18 May 1992 off the coast of North Carolina. It was
the first MPF exercise to test and evaluate the reconfigura-
tion of an MPS squadron load to support the Fleet Marine Force
(FMF) priority force module concept. Fleet Marine Force,
Atlantic (FMFLANT) and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron
ONE (COMPSRON ONE) participated in the exercise. The exercise
specifically tested the Marine Expeditionary Unit slice (MEU
slice) concept. The MEU slice consists of the equipment and
supplies onboard an MPF ship designated to support a MEU. The
squadron ship with primary responsibility for the MEU slice
offload was the SS Obregon. The SS Obregon was chosen to be
offloaded instream (about four miles offshore) using the Lift
on/Lift off (LO/LO) method to unload the designated supplies
and equipment involved in the exercise.
The MEU slice concept presents a unique problem for
offload logistics planning. Priorities and specific load
configuration must be strictly adhered to. Because limited
material handling equipment and lighterage are available on
each ship, planning and constant communication between offload
teams and lighterage crews is critical to the successful MEU
slice operation.
Arrival and Assembly operations for Ocean Venture '92
began on the order of Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force
(CMPF) . Lighterage was assembled and selected pieces of
Material Handling Equipment were offloaded on 11 May so that
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the exercise could begin as scheduled the following morning.
Offload of equipment and supplies from the SS Obregon began on
0-day, 12 May 1992, in the vicinity of Onslow Beach at Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina. The offload was completed in 56
hours, which met the Marine requirement of completion in less
than three days.
Ocean Venture '92 was also the first test of the
transition of operational component control from the Navy to
the Army. Responsibilities and operational control vary
depending on whether the JLOTS Commander is an Army or Navy
Officer. If the JLOTS operation is under Navy component
control, the responsibility includes operations as high as the
beach high water mark. When the operation is under Army
component control, the responsibility extends to delivering
cargo to the receiving authority inland. Regulations to be
followed for operation of lighterage are predetermined by the
JLOTS Commander to be either by Army or Navy methods.
Upon termination of the MPF operations on 15 May 1992, the
Naval component commander assumed responsibilities as the
JLOTS Commander to start the operation. At 2000 on 15 May
1992 , command passed to the Commander of the Army Seventh
Transportation Group, who became the JLOTS Commander for the
duration of the operation. Once again, communication and
teamwork were key to a successful transition.
The Army portion of the Ocean Venture '92 JLOTS operation
included an instream offload of 746 pieces of infantry
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equipment from the Fast Sealift Ship USNS Pollux within 72
hours and the discharge of 46 of 200 scheduled containers from
the Auxiliary Crane Ship USNS Flickertail State within 96
hours. The operation, completed on 18 May, was deemed a
success despite some equipment problems and rough seas which
limited the offload of all of the containers.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Conclusions
The following conclusions resulted from the evaluation
of MPF and JLOTS operations:
The Force Module Concept for a MEU Module was validated
during the operation. Equipment associated with the MEU
slice was easily accessible for offload.
The exercise demonstrated that a MEU slice instream
offload can be completed within three days.
The MEU slice concept adds challenges of selectivity to
offload operations. With limited material handling
equipment and lighterage, planning and communication are
the cornerstones of success for a MEU offload.
The 7th Transportation Group accomplished their assign-
ment by offloading the 24th Infantry Division equipment
within the 7 2-hour timeline.
Offload operations were hampered by poor lighterage
control and an ill-defined chain of command. Communi-
cation systems and equipment were inadequate to meet the
intense communication needs of an instream offload.
Environmental, safety, and security concerns need to be




The following recommendations are presented for
consideration:
An intense, coordinated training program aimed at
developing Officer and NCO proficiency prior to the
exercise should be developed. It is critical that
training dollars for MPF and JLOTS operations become a
priority.
A review of unit Tables of Organization and Equipment
should be accomplished to ensure appropriate equipment
and personnel are earmarked for Logistics Over the Shore
operations.
- The Joint Letter of Instruction detailing communications
during JLOTS operations, which is slowly evolving, needs
to move quickly to the field so that it may be incorpor-
ated into future exercises and operations.
A Joint Task Force should meet and review service
procedures to resolve interoperability issues. The
review should also examine ways to reduce redundant




AAA Arrival and Assembly Area
AAOE Arrival and Assembly Operations Element
AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicles
BLCP Beach Lighterage Control Point
BPT Beach Party Team
CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force
CMPF Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force
CNA Center for Naval Analysis
CNSE Commander, Naval Support Element
COMPSRON Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron
COT Container Operations Terminal
CSNP Causeway Section, Non-Powered
CSP Causeway Section, Powered
CSSA Combat Service Support Area
FIE Fly-in-Echelon
FMF Fleet Marine Force
FMFLANT Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FSS Fast Sealift Ship
ISO International Standards Organization
ISOPACK Refers to configuration of causeway sections
aboard a T-ACS




























Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Lighterage Control Center
Joint Logistics Over the Shore
Lighter Air Cushion Vehicle







Logistics Over the Shore
Logistics Support Vessel
Logistics Vehicle System







North Atlantic Treaty Organization






























Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat
Roll on/Roll off
RO/RO Discharge Facility
Rough Terrain Container Handlers
Survey, Liaison, Reconnaissance Party
Side Loadable Warping Tug
Signal Operating Instruction
Auxiliary Crane Ships
United Nations Security Council
United States Commander in Chief, Atlantic
United States Atlantic Command
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USS OCEANA (constructive CV) CVW-3
ATF
COMPHIBRON 14 (CO PHIBSCOL)




COMPHIBRON TWO (EMB OBREGON)
MPSRON-1 (less BOBO)
CNBG-2 DET A
II MEF Offload Control Group


















Task Group 145.6 MCM Group
CTG 145.6 COMCMGRU TWO







Task Group 145.7 Submarine Operations Group
CTG 145.7 COMCARGRU EIGHT
TG 145.7 USS JAMES K. POLK
USS SILVERSIDES
USS KITTIWAKE
Task Group 145.8 Navy LOTS/JLOTS
CTG 145.8 CNBG-2 DET A






Task Group 145.9 Rescue Coordination Center
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OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE MEB AND MPSRONS
(i) opsancis sckiair or nzz w
pzxsorm pes eacs of m 3
HAR1T1KZ PWOSiriOMG EOSCES
osac OSJ TOW.
BCKI3 746 24 770
Ground Combat Element 5,303 276 6,079
Combat Service Support Element 2,663 419 3,087
Havf Support !ler.ent 379 379
14,980 1,575 16,655







dumber 3 5 5
Length 321 ft 755 ft 671 ft
Sean 106 ft 90 ft 105 ft
Depth 68 ft 70 ft 32 ft
Draft 32 ft 33 ft 29 ft
Displacement 43,754 Lt 46,552 L? 40,346 L?
Speed 20 toots 17.5 fcnots 13 fcots
Endurance 13,000 !C. 10,300 !C. 12,340 KM
Vehicle Soil an/Sol! off Area 152,52 4 sq ft 120,080 sg ft 162,500 sq ft
Containers 540 332 493
3uU fuel 1. 544,000 gal 1,233,000 gal 1,604,915 gal
Potable Hater 94,780 gal 65,000 gal 31,771 gal
Capital ired Cost per Ship* $159.1 mil $134.75 nil $174.33 ril j










2, 483.640 cu ft
6,236,915 ga
366,111 ga






2. 124.800 cu ft
6, US, 000 gal
32S.OOO gal










»n « rw„ ,
CARGO FEX KPSR08
53 Tanks
109 Irsored Assault Vehicles
24 155 rcn Howitrers (Towed)
6 155 sen Howitrers (Self Propelled)
6 8-io Howitzers (Self Propelled)
96 TOW Missiles
96 Dragon Missiles
190 50 cal Machine Guns
118 MX-19, 40 xb Grenade Launchers
194 7.62 mm Machine Guns
Combat Support Equipment (Major Item):
Motor Transport
75 Tractors, 5-Ton
15 40-Ton Low Bed Trailers
73 Seaii-Trailers
284 5-Ton Cargo Trucks
46 5-Ton Dump Trucks
19 1200-Gal Fuel Trucks
26 5000-Gal Fuel Trailers
14 1000-Gal Water Truckj
116 460-Gal Water Trailers
27 5-Ton Wreckers
625 Light Truck 1 1/4 Ton or Less
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ORCO Pffl KPSROt (CoatiaucJ)



















800,000-Gal Hater Distribution System
Floodlight Sets
POL Storage and Distribution:
10 Tactical Airfield Puel Dispensing Sjste
8 Amphibious Assault fuel Dispensing syst




1 260 Bed Medical Pacility










* 30 day supply of each.
Individual Equipment. Administrative Supplies
Sulk Puel - JP-5, HOCAS, plus Packaged POL
Construction Material for Fortification and Barrier
Anno (if) 126 Different types (3,500 Tons)
A) 73 Different types (3,000 Tons)
Medical Supplies
Repair Parts for all Embarked Equipment
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